Refresh-tokens should be handled more gracefully

Refresh tokens should be given more care than they currently are. Specifically their scope and retention policies leave far too much to be desired.

Retention and Management

Seemingly inconsistent token retrieval

Not listed on the documentation provided (Refresh Tokens) is that the nuance around retrieving the access token from the google social provider.

Upon further review of google documentation as well as external form, I found that this flow is expected & consistent, though not desired:

This value instructs the Google authorization server to return a refresh token and an access token the first time that your application exchanges an authorization code for tokens.

Note the wording of “first time” in the above is not captured on the auth0 documentation. This wording causes the following headaches for IDP integrators:

  • Currently authorized users will NEVER have a refresh_token
  • Newly authorized users will only have refresh_token until a subsequent user-initiated login
  • API integrators must store the refresh_token locally for each account, significantly reducing the ease of implementation (notably for applications which don’t need store the user for any other reason such as consumer microservice with discrete business logic).


  1. Please include a note that the refresh_token can be forcibly regenerated by including the approval_prompt=force query parameters into the /authorize flow.
  2. Please create an enhancement within your system to capture and retain the refresh_token when a response is returned from google without the refresh_token


Single service; universal take-over

In even a medium size environment (e.g. 30 services), under the current model present by auth0 it would take one application one vulnerability to globally and perpetually compromise the users of all socially (where the social provider supports refresh) authenticated users. Users would be unprotected until all access_tokens are refreshed or until they have revoked permission from the application. There is not natural expiration of the token.

In my experience, companies stop updating functionality around service 10 and stop reviewing logs around service roll out 15. This implicit trust (human nature) can cause these services to be excellent attack points.


There should at the very least be a panic button on the appropriate social page saying “Revoke all access tokens” to automatically revoke all access tokens (revoking an access token does also revoke the refresh_token):

If the token is an access token and it has a corresponding refresh token, the refresh token will also be revoked.

This would allow an administrator of my application to automatically ensure that my users are secure against future attacks while vulnerabilities are addressed


To be blunt, I feel that the service you’re offering is limited at this point. The issues above are clearly the result of expecting that the integrators to auth0 are not lazy and don’t make mistakes. I prefer to work with the opposite assumption. I’m extremely lazy and I assume everyone else is too. I make mistakes, and I know you do too.

In my opinion a better way for me to consume your services is to not expose the refresh_token to me. But rather to expose a mechanism for me to securely refresh the access token of a user or a collection of users which performs whatever vendor specific logic in the background. Preferably the non-batching version of this endpoint would return the token json object for immediate consumption, but even if it has to be reacquired that is fine. Yes, there should be an option for the services to receive the refresh_token but I don’t believe this should be exposed via the default read:user_idp_tokens permission required to make a one-off request to a social provider’s services.

I want the authorization data provided to my application to have a guaranteed expiration date, such that I can shut down my application/regenerate a key and move on know that a hiccup in over-logging, over storing, under-securing, will be resolved in 2 hours. Yes, in infosec terms 2 hours is 1:59:59 too long but it’s far better than the perpetual trust that is currently expected of every single offline integration built for your system today.

Thank you for your time.

Hi Colton!
You are right. Today the service provides mechanisms for you to obtain and leverage 3rd party RTs, but doesn’t provide an abstraction on top of it to automatically handle their use and normalize across sources. The RTs are provided to you as is, and a lot is left to your skill and due diligence.
This is an area we might consider for future improvement, and your feedback is super valuable in that regard. Thank you for taking the time to write it down!


Your response seems to drop the ball regarding your sales tagline. Integrating with Auth0 is supposed to assist in reducing the security/auditing required

Working with Auth0 means working with a vetted, secure solution & partner who understands that you expect a return on your security investment.

Unfortunately, the first, minor issue I’ve come across in a pre-sales scenario is met with ambivalence. Notably, not even the documentation was updated to highlight the work around required to ensure your IDP feature works consistently.


I’m sorry you are experiencing some trouble during initial take off with Auth0 @sparksis. Moving forward we would really like to capture your feedback here and share it directly with our product team. Please check out this FAQ on submitting feedback and fill out the Feedback form here. All feedback sent through this form is triaged and read by the Product team (nothing is automated), and the more context you’re able to provide, the better. In the future when we have the opportunity to launch a beta program for anything in that related area we would love to get you involved as well. If you get a chance to share your feedback, our product team may want to discuss your ideas further as we look to the horizon. We appreciate your honesty and would enjoy the chance to work with you further on your journey.

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